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Introduction
1 Contrary to  the widespread tendency to  relegate  religion to  the rank of  reactionary
forces, religious actors and ideas have always been vectors of social change and important
in development initiatives in Africa –  one only has to think of  Catholic  missions’  or
Islamic elites’ engagement with education in colonial times (Cooper 2006; Brenner 2001).
However, such engagements got increasingly unnoticed when modernization theories of
development became dominant in the 1950s and 1960s. Only very recently has religion
been rediscovered as a force of change (cf. Ter Haar & Ellis 2006). This is due to both
changes  in  thinking about  development  and  changes  that  have  occurred  in  African
society, and this specifically in the religious domain. 
 
The ‘religious turn’ in Development Studies
2 In 2004, the World Bank published a book tellingly entitled Mind, Heart, and Soul in the Fight
Against  Poverty.  It  emphasizes  the  need  for  collaboration  between  religious  and
development  organizations  in  the  fight  against  poverty  and to  further  development;
Christian  and Islamic  elites  are  considered  inescapable  allies  in  the  execution  of
programmes in domains  such as health, education, the environment and peacekeeping
(Marshall & Keough 2004). In the same vein, the Human Development Report 2007/2008
makes a plea to include religious values and partners in climate change policies.1
3 This explicit positive attention paid to religion in development cooperation circles over
the last few years may come as a surprise, as religion and development seemed to be
worlds apart for a long time. In the modernization paradigm that became dominant in
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Development Studies and practice from the 1950s and 1960s onwards, religion was not
considered  an  issue.  If  it  was  treated  as  a  subject  at  all,  it  was  mainly  seen  as  an
impediment to development,  or  as  something that  would ultimately be overcome,  as
development would lift people out of ignorance. State-led and top-down development
programmes left little room for participation of societal groups, including religious ones,
in  the  policy  process,  and  for  development  scholars  and  policy  makers  to  consider
initiatives beyond the state.
4 The situation changed gradually in the 1980s as structural adjustment policies and less
involvement by the State in sectors such as education, healthcare and social services led
to a diversification of development actors (NGOs, associations), that attempted  to fill in
the  gaps  left  by  the  State.  In  the  meantime,  strict  macro-economic  approaches  to
development were replaced or in many cases supplemented by more holistic views of
‘human development’ (Sen 1997, 2000) that go beyond a purely economic approach by
including social, psychical and cultural factors too. ‘Livelihoods’ approaches (Chambers &
Conway  1992;  Carney  1998)  with  their  emphasis  on  people’s  own  strengths  and
development strategies became influential in tandem with participatory and bottom-up
policies.  This  pattern  fitted  nicely  with  the  neoliberal  paradigm  and  its  focus  on
privatization and citizens’ own responsibilities (Kaag et al. 2004). 
5 However while these new approaches claimed to be holistic and people-centered, they
were  still  predominantly  ‘lay’  in  character,  with  an accent  on the  (socio-)  economic
aspects of human development. It was only towards the turn of the century that religion
and culture became more important in the analysis. A revealing example is the theory of
the  ‘clash  of  civilizations’  (Huntington  1996)  that  has  become  influential  in  the
understanding of geo-political conflicts. Interestingly, this basic recognition that culture
(including religion) matters in the global era, which has been negatively interpreted by
Huntington,  has  inspired  others  in  Development  Studies,  as  well  as  in  development
practice, to see religion as a force in development, as is shown by the title of the World
Bank report cited  above. 
6 In the meantime, an entire corpus of empirical work has developed that rejects visions
that are too simplistic and generalizing and shows the crucial role of religious institutions
 in the functioning of contemporary African societies and their economic development
(Copans 1989;  Fall  2011).  In the case of Senegal,  the accent  is  on Islam as a popular
political counterculture (Coulon 1983; Seck 2010) but it has also been  questioned whether
Islam should be seen as a means by which  political and religious elites  are retaining
power (Gueye & Seck 2011). In general, the religious sphere is considered to provide social
protection on the basis of charitative principles (Vuarin 1990; Weiss 2002) while empirical
studies have also demonstrated that religion can be seen as a force of change (Brenner
1993) in development. A specific and growing corpus of literature concerns faith-based
organizations (Bornstein 2003).  These organizations may have diverse objectives ranging
from evangelization in combination with the promotion of local economies (Yaro 1998) to
fighting HIV/AIDS (Delaunay et al. 1998) but are generally considered to be more effective
because of a supposed cultural proximity to their target groups (Benthall 2007).
7 Around the turn of  the 21st century,  anthropological  approaches linking religion and
public life (Sounaye 2007) have multiplied. These show the strong societal engagements
of religious actors (Kaag 2011), and religiously inspired forms of citizenship implicating
religious  militants  in  the  urban  public  sphere  (Gomez-Perez  &  Leblanc  2007).  Social
juniors, like youngsters and women, access new modes of public expression (Masquelier
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2009; Soares 2009). Recent anthropological works often explicitly highlight the religious
issues involved in politics, policies and the public sphere but it should  be acknowledged
that  ‘anthropological’  voices have to date been marginal in mainstream development
thinking.2
 
Religious revival in action
8 Parallel to the changes in thinking about development described above,  a number of
changes  in  society  have  contributed  to  the  renewed  visibility  of  religion  in  the
development  arena.  These  concern  the  phenomenon of  religious  ‘revival’.  While  the
religious factor has always been important in Africa,  new dynamics have given these
religious  elements  a  more  openly  public  dimension  over  the  last  few  decades.
 Globalization and technological progress (Saint-Lary, Samson & Amiotte-Suchet 2011),
which have  contributed to  a  globalization of  religious  discourses,  have  helped these
changes to occur. Pentecostal churches and Islamic reformist movements are using new
technological  means  to  appropriate  the  mass  media  and,  in  doing  so,  are  reviving
rivalries with other actors.  Religious reformism, be it  Islamic,  Catholic or Protestant,
inspires religious leaders to diffuse strong norms, rectify cult practices and instill social
and moral values.  
9 The phenomenon of ‘revival’, which can be observed across Africa since the 1990s, is the
result of several factors. Since the 1970s3, the contexts of the Kippur war, the oil boom
and the severe droughts in sub-Saharan Africa have contributed to the reinforcement of
African –Arab relationships (Triaud 2007).  In addition,  the Islamic Revolution in Iran
(1979) gave a new face and new international visibility to political Islam and created new
vigor among certain sectors of Muslims in Sub-Saharan Africa (Triaud 2007: 10). The new
connections between the Arab world and Sub-Saharan Africa (Loimeijer 2005; Bunza 2005;
Miran  2006;  Kaag  2007)  and  the  subsequent  bilateral  cooperation  have  resulted  in
substantive flows of development aid (Cissé 1994).  The Pentecostal churches have not
lagged far behind, with the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (UCKG) being a clear
testimony to this.  The UCKG is well known for its capacity to capture the media and
mobilize its faithful followers exponentially (Corten, Dozon & Oro 2003).
10 Sub-Saharan Africa is thus currently observing an expansion of its ‘religious public space’
(Holder 2009) where proselytizing strategies are being elaborated but action plans are
also being introduced to improve societal relations. Religious elites today are frequently
investing  in  struggles  with  religious  and  socio-political  objectives.  The  gist  of  the
discourses and public actions testify to this. The majority of the contributions in this
issue show how religious organizations are participating in the construction of public
structures for health and education, just as they are also installing forms of solidarity to
face calamities and cope with economic crises when necessary.
 
Religious elites in the development arena 
11 The new visibility of religious actors and ideas in ‘development’, as elaborated on in the
previous sections, is an interesting phenomenon that deserves more in-depth attention.
However, we think we should not restrict ourselves to the currently fashionable Faith-
Based NGOs (FBOs) (Bornstein 2003; Hofer 2003) but discuss the topic from a historicizing
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angle and take a broad societal perspective. We therefore propose focusing on religious
elites,  be  they  individuals,  leaders  and/or  spokesmen of  official  organizations,  or  of
informal groups. This allows for to the inclusion of historical examples. In addition, we
have not restricted ourselves to local dynamics but have also included a transnational
perspective.  The  articles  show  how  local  religious  elites  may  be  brokers  between
international  organizations  and  local  target  groups,  such  as  the  Senegalese  Islamic
association  Jamra  (Gomez-Perez  this  volume).  Their  activities  may  be  financed  by
international  financial  streams  such  as  zakat from  the  Gulf  countries  or  by  the
mobilization of resources by local believers. 
12 In addition, the polysemic character of the term ‘elites’ should not lead to confusion:
religious elites may not only include ‘official’ holders of religious knowledge disposing of
theological certificates,  but also preachers formed ‘on the spot’  but not less active in
public life. Religious elites share the characteristic that they enjoy an authority among
the believers. The latter may take the religious elites’ knowledge, relational capital and/
or charisma as the main pillars of  legitimacy,  but the result  is  always the same:  the
religious  elites  are  considered  to  be  capable  of  acting  in  the  public  domain  and
transferring messages that have a strong societal bearing. The contributions to this issue
reflect  on the  positions,  strategies  and perceptions  of  these  religious  elites  who are
engaged in ‘development’  in  one way or  another,  and this  in  different  West  African
contexts, (Niger, Burkina Faso, Senegal,  and Nigeria),  and in different periods of time
(from pre-colonial to very recent years). 
13 Nasir Mohammed Baba analyses the role of the ulama (Islamic clerics) in the promotion of
Islamic education in northern Nigeria from the pre-colonial to the post-colonial era. He
describes the complex historical pattern of co-operation, competition and avoidance that
characterize  the  relationship  between  Ulama  and  the  state  in  the  education  arena,
concluding that the Nigerian state is currently acknowledging the importance of good-
quality basic education for all but has failed to constructively engage with and regulate
the participation of Islamic religious elites and groups in the provision of education. On
the contrary,  Baba argues,  the growing sense of  isolation felt  in  Islamic  schools  has
enabled  religious  elites  to  consolidate  their  control  over  curricula  content  and
management  structures  in  ways  that  may  not  always  contribute  to  educational
development and national unity. 
14 Abdoulaye  Sounaye’s  contribution  focuses  on  the  expansion  of  Islamic  development
initiatives in Niger in the last decade. He particularly looks at how the notion of doing
development the Islamic way has emerged in the public sphere and mobilized a diversity
of Muslim actors.  Comparing the views and activities of the international Islamic NGO
AMA  (Agence  des  Musulmans  d’Afrique)  and  local  Islamic  development  entrepreneurs,
Sounaye  analyses what doing development in the Islamic way means for them and how
this affects  their activities and  relationships with the target groups.
15 Katrin Langewiesche deals with the question of interreligious dialogue in Burkina Faso, a
topical issue that has hardly received any attention to date in the social sciences. She
considers the partnerships that have been forged over the last ten years in the domain of
healthcare between religious organizations and the state in Burkina Faso. She thus shows
that  religious  elites  are  increasingly  involved  in  transmitting  information  on  public
health issues. In addition, interreligious dialogue in the Burkinabe context is becoming a
way for organizations to position themselves in the development arena vis-à-vis the state
and international donors.    
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16 The contribution by Muriel Gomez-Perez looks more specifically at the experiences of two
Islamic  NGOs  in  Senegal  in  their  fight  against  HIV/AIDS.  She  discusses  how  these
organizations have established themselves in a context where the State is retreating and
international  aid  organizations  are  becoming  more  involved.  The  Senegalese  Islamic
NGOs on the one hand have responded to this international call  and are successfully
engaging religious leaders in the fight against AIDS but at the same time developing their
own approaches inspired and legitimized by the Quran and the Hadiths, which do not
always comply with the approaches and objectives of the State and the international
donor community. 
17 Despite the variety of actors and contexts covered in this issue, some common themes
emerge.  These  centre  around  questions  of  collaboration  and  rivalry  with  other
development actors, such as the state and non-religious organizations; the importance of
legitimizing discourses, be it towards international partners or local target groups; the
ways in which they construct their tasks and roles in response to societal needs and
opportunities; and the effects of developmental engagement of religious elites for the
outlook of society and the State. 
 
Collaboration and rivalry
18 Religious  actors  and  others  involved  in  ‘development’,  such  as  the  State,  secular
international  organizations and secular  local  NGOs,  maintain links that  may go from
frank collaboration to more or less open rivalry.
19 Sometimes,  the  religious  may position itself  as  a  real  rival  by  openly  criticizing the
actions of state agencies and/or secular NGOs that are considered immoral or in conflict
with religious rules.  Conflicts  over norms can thus cause a  test  of  strength between
religious and secular institutions. Muriel Gomez-Perez shows how Islamic elites consider
the mass distribution of condoms as an invitation to immoral behavior and, just like the
Pope, firmly reject institutions that collaborate in this kind of activity.
20 Nevertheless, analysis of development arenas also shows relationships between religious
actors and others that are based on interdependence and collaboration, be it formal or
informal, in public discourse and/or action. The influence of the religious elites is, for
instance,  largely mobilized for the legitimization of  sensitizing programs in different
domains, such as in the fight against HIV/AIDS (contributions by Katrin Langewiesche
and Muriel Gomez-Perez this issue). A number of religious actors engaged in a fight of
pan-African and global dimensions, consider the ideals of ‘development’, such as family
planning, vaccinations, the struggle against poverty, as issues concerning both Muslims
and Christians, while the economic conjuncture is an additional mobilizing factor. The
organizations  work  to  show  their  legitimacy  in  the  development  context.  Katrin
Langewiesche demonstrates, in relation to the interreligious dialogue in Burkina Faso,
that this sometimes leads to the construction of a ‘religiously correct’ discourse in the
face  of  international  organizations.  In  any  case,  it  appears  that,  among  many
international organizations, it has been realized that their ideal of ‘participation’ cannot
be reached except with the support of influential, charismatic persons. Among these one
has to count religious leaders. As a result, a growing number of religious intermediaries
are  emerging  in  the  development  sector,  who  present  themselves  as  ‘translators’  of
 canonic texts and  show the target groups that certain actions are well founded from a
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religious  perspective.  As  is  shown by  Abdoulaye  Sounaye,  these  actors  accumulate  a
double competency register based on the one hand on their knowledge of the official
language and their western-style education, and on the other hand on their knowledge of
Islam which permits them to argue theologically. They can, for instance, sensitize the
population to participate in vaccination campaigns by citing the right Hadiths.
21 However, as the religious is often plural, co-operation of some with the state may incite
the dissatisfaction of others who accuse them of being corrupted. This raises the question
of the degree and effect of religious segmentation in the case of communal management
of societal questions together with government agencies. Considering the dynamics of
rivalry within the Islamic sphere, certain actors have seen it as their mission to counter
the  anti-western  discourse  of  some  of  their  fellow-believers  which,  in  their  eyes,  is
counterproductive if one wants to contribute to ‘development’. Within one religion, the
readings of religious texts may differ and lead to different visions of the desired and
necessary sensitizing actions.
22 In  a  more  general  sense,  religious  discourses  are  to  an  important  degree  based  on
salvation rhetoric, encouraging believers to work in the Here and Now and think of the
Hereafter. They construct a moral economy of salvation in which development actions
take shape.
 
The religious in the construction of the ‘social state’
23 The dynamics described above present themselves in a context of crisis, both financial
and economic, having brought the continent to a situation of prolonged poverty for both
urban and rural populations. The hopes raised in the 1990s by democratization policies
have today given way to a general feeling of deception. Observations are indeed not that
positive:  the failure and privatization of the State,  repeated cereal crises (2004-2005),
electricity cuts, poor functioning of health provision systems, uncontrolled urbanization,
and revolts  against  the high costs of  living.  In the face of  the so-called crisis  of  the
extended family and the tensions on community solidarity, religious solidarity networks
are filling the gap and offering support in a context of precariousness. They are substitute
for the State in its social and protective function and appropriating the public policy
domain related to gender, the fight against poverty, education and health. It should be
noted that the budgets of religious organizations, both Christian and Islamic, are also
progressively permitting them to play such a role.
24 These networks have been enjoying financial support from abroad for many years. On the
Islamic side, petrodollars have  been  financing development activities and sponsoring
NGOs, while on the Christian side, the funds for African Pentecostal networks are coming
from the US and have resulted  in the these churches being viewed as ‘American’. In their
more recent and fundamentalist versions, the neo-Pentecostals, like the Universal Church
of the Kingdom of God, have been receiving funds also  from Brazil. These financial flows
have contributed to the structuring of transnational hierarchies and a strong dependency
on external support.
25 However, local religious leaders have been successful in mobilizing their followings and
gaining relative economic autonomy beyond their external funding. The religious sphere
is benefitting from an economic basis fed by the believers themselves who collect money,
even  sometimes  contributing  substantial  sums  to  their  religious  institutions.  The
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economic power of the religious sphere is not a new phenomenon in African societies, but
is  now taking on particular  forms and dimensions.  Whether one thinks of  zakat,  the
Maecenas-ship of big entrepreneurs (Cisse 2009), ostentatious gifts to pastors (Furtado,
Laurent & Plaideau 2009), benedictions, the ‘prayer economy’ (Soares 1996, 2005; Last
1988) with gifts of cash during celebrations like the Mawlud (Saint-Lary 2006) or whether
one  thinks  of  adherence  fees  to  associations  or  religious  marketing  (Soares  2007)
(knickknacks, posters, cassettes, books), the religious market can be seen to be inserting
itself between the market economy and the moral economy (Triaud & Villalon 2009). This
allows  the  religious  sphere  to  exist  and play  a  role  in  the  development  arena,  with
substantial room for maneuver regarding objectives. The initiatives of religious actors are
neither exclusively financed by secular institutions in need of religious caution or by a
foreign religious hierarchy. They are partly financing themselves,  and thus becoming
increasingly  autonomous  in  the  development  domain.  The  religious  elites  are  thus
participating  fully,  with  their  own  means,  in  the  functioning  of  African  states  and
societies.    
26 All of these phenomena, which seem to indicate the emergence of a religious welfare state
– or what Maria Das Dores Campos Machado (2003) qualifies as ‘welfare organization’ –
 raise the question of secularity. In effect, this participation of the religious sphere in
public policies shows how secularization does not,  as in Europe,  lead to a process of
declining social  influence of  religion (Williame 2006).  The existence of  a  postmodern
religious fact, or to adopt the expression of Hassane Souley (2009) of a postmodern Islam,
does  not  preclude  the  fact  that  the  concerned  States  are  secular,  with  a  specific
understanding  of  this  principle.  The  three  pillars  of  secularity,  namely  the  equal
treatment of all  religions, freedom of religion, and the institutional separation of the
religious and the political domain (Baubérot 2007) are articulated in a specific manner in
West Africa. In addition, considering the role of religious elites in development arenas
means taking into account the possible existence of secularities ‘in an African way’, where
the religious participates in the construction and functioning of African states, without
necessarily  conquering  them.  What  these  religious  elites  in  ‘development’  want  to
conquer is less the State in its regal sense (justice, police, etc) than the state in its social
dimension.
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NOTES
1.  See, in particular, an occasional paper accompanying the report, entitled “For God’s Sake, Do
Something! How Religions Can find Unexpected Unity Around Climate Change” (Krznaric 2007).
2.  Interestingly, the ‘discovery’ of religion by development theorists and practitioners, seems to
imply a (renewed) appreciation of anthropology as a discipline in these circles.
3.  Jean-Louis  Triaud  (2007)  indicates  two  other  periods  that  have  been  important  for  the
expansion of Islam in Sub Saharan Africa, namely the 18th century, the era of the Fulbe jihad, and
the colonial period.
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